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The Montana Inheritance Tax*
James A. Poore, Jr.**
INTRODUCTION
The Montana inheritance tax, as presently interpreted by case law,
can be understood only after a general examination of the relevant statu-
tory provisions.'
Subject to certain exceptions and qualifications, the tax, which is
imposed when the recipient becomes beneficially entitled in possession or
expectancy, 2 is upon any transfer by sucession or will,' or by means of cer-
tain statutory substitutes for wills. Five such substitutes are specified:
(1) transfer in contemplation of death, 4 (2) transfers to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after deathj (3) powers of appointment, 6
(4) joint tenancies, including co-ownership of government bonds,7 and
(5) insurance.8
The rate of the tax depends upon the relationship of the recipient to
the decedent9 and upon the value of the taxable estate.' 0 The primary
rate on the first $25,000 less specific exemptions," varies from 2 percent
to 8 percent, depending upon the relationship. The maximum rate, when
the benefit exceeds $100,000 ranges from 8 percent for close relatives
to 32 percent for nonrelatives. 12 The applicable rate is applied to the
clear market value of the transferred property 3 as of the time of death 4
after allowance for specific deductions 5 and exemptions, 16 to determine
the actual dollar amount of the tax.
*This article is based on an address given by Mr. Poore at the annual Law School
Tax Institute, Montana State University, Missoula, Montana, December 5, 1964.
**Member of the Montana Bar. B.A. Stanford University. LL.B. Harvard University.
Partner, law firm of Poore, Poore, McKenzie and Roth, Butte, Montana.
'The Montana inheritance tax law is not contained in the taxation statutes in Title 84,
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, but is in Chapter 44 of Title 91 covering Wills,
Succession, Probate and Guardianship. See §§ 91-4401 to -4467. Hereinafter REVISED
CODES OF MONTANA will be cited as R.C.M.
2R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4403.
2R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4401.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4402.
5R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4402.
0R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4404.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4405.
8R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4406.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4409.
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 91-4409, -4410.
UR.C.M. 1947, § 91-4414. These exemptions are: $17,500 widow; $5,000 husband;
$2,000 lineal issue, lineal ancestor or adopted child; $300.00 brother, sister or
descendant. Certain charitable bequests are wholly exempt from the operation of
this section.
"
2R.C.M. 1947, §§ 91-4409, -4410.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4407.
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 91-4415, -4432.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4407.
"-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 91-4413, -4414.
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The beneficiary is primarily liable for the payment of the tax, but
both the executor or administrator and the beneficiary are personally
liable for its payment. Additionally, to insure payment of the tax the
property involved is subjected to a ten year tax lien.17
Credit against the amount of the tax is allowed for taxes paid on the
same property in other states.'8 Children of a decedent mother are also
entitled to a credit for taxes paid by the mother upon transfers to her
from her husband's estate if she dies within ten years of her husband and
transfers the same property to the children.' 9
Finally, there is a section imposing a Montana estate tax. In essence,
this section places a tax on the estates of resident decedents to the extent
of any excess credit allowed by the federal estate tax for state death taxes
over the total death taxes levied by the states.
20
Montana has had some sort of an inheritance tax act since 1897,21
and forty-nine decisions by the Montana Supreme Court have directly
interpreted the inheritance tax law.2 2 This litigation has, for the most
part, dealt with the above mentioned substitutes for wills. The balance of
this paper will deal primarily with a consideration of the more important
decisions giving interpretation to the inheritance tax law of Montana.
TRANSFERS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH 23
When the motive for an inter vivos transfer is similar to that which
would cause the decedent to make a will, this statutory device treats the
property as if passing by will. The first case on this subject, In re Wad-
worth's Estate,24 laid down the controlling interpretation of this section:
The dominant purpose is to reach substitutes for testamentary
dispositions and thus to prevent evasion of the tax. As the trans-
fer may otherwise have all the indicia of a valid gift inter vivos,
the differentiating factor must be found in the transferor's mo-
'
7R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4415.
R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4412.
'
9R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4414(2).
'-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4411. The code contains numerous other provisions covering miscel-
laneous items such as a discount for prompt payment, prepayment of estimated tax
to avoid penalties and interest; bond to reduce interest on deferred payment to six
per cent and provisions with respect to mechanics such as notices, appraisals, hear-
ings, and enforcement provisions, which have in most instances not resulted in
litigation and need not be listed in detail to obtain an understanding of the theory of
the tax. See, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 91-4416, -4418, -4419.
"Laws of Montana 1897, at 83-92.
2A few of those cases no longer have any forseeable value as they are concerned with
provisions no longer in the law and not helpful to the construction of the present law.
See, Hinds v. Willcox, 22 Mont. 4, 55 Pac. 355 (1898) ; In re Tuohy's Estate, 35
Mont. 431, 90 Pac. 170 (1907); State ex rel. Floyd v. District Court, 41 Mont. 357,
109 Pac. 438 (1910).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4402.
"92 Mont. 135, 11 P.2d 788 (1932).
[Vol. 26,
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tive. It is contemplation of death, not necessarily contemplation
of imminent death, to which the statute refers.
25
Since the motive of the transferor is the "differentiating factor" in
many instances, what is or is not a transfer in contemplation of death
will depend upon the facts of the individual case. The following factual
situations are illustrative of dominant motives other than contemplation
of death:
1. A husband purchased real estate solely in the name of his wife
with the explicit understanding that she was to convey it to him upon
request. The court held that such an conveyance, within two years of the
wife's death, was not in contemplation of death but was motivated by her
trust obligation. The wife never had any beneficial interest in the
property.
26
2. A decedent grantor, in exchange for stipulated monthly pay-
ments for her lifetime, agreed to transfer immediate possession of a hotel.
This transaction was held not to be a transfer in contemplation of death,
but rather a sale for valuable consideration.
2 7
3. A rancher transferred his ranch to a corporation. He gave stock
to his wife and other relatives who had performed services at the ranch
with the understanding that they would receive an interest in the prop-
erty. However, he transferred no stock to a son who had not wished to
work on the ranch. The court held contemplation of death was not the
dominant motive for the transfers. Rather, they were rewards for services
rendered.2
8
4. A husband believed that he held certain property in joint tenancy
with his wife, but discovered that it stood in his name alone. Subse-
quently, within two years of his death, he caused it to be conveyed to
himself and his wife as joint tenants. The transfer was held to be moti-
vated by a desire to arrange his affairs in accordance with his prior be-
liefs, not in contemplation of death.
29
Rather than contemplation of death, motives behind other transfers
have been identified as: a desire to relieve the donor of responsibilities
and permit him to travel,30 evidencing a joint venture,3 1 and a desire to
aid the donor's children financially during the donor's lifetime.
3 2
If nothing else, the case of State v. Ludington33 indicates that judges
on occasion have soft hearts.3 4 In that case the decedent, more than three
'Ud. at 145, 11 P.2d at 791.
'In re Mayer's Estate, 110 Mont. 66, 99 P.2d 209 (1940).
'In re Seebree's Estate, 122 Mont. 509, 206 P.2d 553 (1949).
'In re Warren's Estate, 128 Mont. 395, 275 P.2d 843 (1954).
'State v. Rice, 134 Mont. 265, 329 P.2d 451 (1958).
"State v. Keating, 134 Mont. 372, 332 P.2d 906 (1958).
3In re MeAnelly's Estate, 127 Mont. 158, 258 P.2d 741 (1953).
"State v. Ludington, 134 Mont. 384, 333 P.2d 873 (1958).
=Ibid.
"4In re MeAnelly's Estate, supra note 31, supports this proposition.
1965]
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years before death, gave his daughter $10,000 and recorded a satisfaction
of a mortgage securing a debt due from his son for more than $6,800.
His will provided that the gift to the daughter had been in full settlement
of her rights in the estate, and that the son should take nothing from the
estate other than cancellation of the son's debts. The court held that
certain testimony, which was not quoted in the opinion, showed the
testator's motives in making the gifts to be other than in contemplation
of death. The language of the will was merely to explain why the de-
cedent left nothing to his children.35
TRANSFERS TO TAKE EFFECT IN POSSESSION OR ENJOYMENT
AT OR AFTER DEATH 36
Most of the Montana cases under this section pose relatively few
problems since the possession or enjoyment was clearly postponed until
after the death of the transferor. In State Board of Equalization v. Cole,37
United States bonds, registered in the names of co-owners, were not de-
livered by the purchaser-donor to the other co-owner during the lifetime
of the purchaser. Although the other co-owner did have access to the
joint bank box in which the bonds were stored, the court found this right
of access had been exercised only as agent of the purchaser. Thus, de-
livery was held insufficient and possession and enjoyment were consid-
ered as postponed until after the purchaser-donor's death.
In another case a mother made an outright transfer of property to
her children with the understanding that they would pay her an annuity
during her lifetime. The children then transferred the property to a
trust to pay the annuity during the mother's lifetime and return the
property to them after her death. The court considered this as a single
transaction and taxed the transfer as one to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after death.-"
In In re Estate of Oppenheimer" a woman agreed in an ante-nuptial
settlement to give up her dower interest and the right to any inheritance
from her husband's estate in consideration for $150,000 to be paid to her
in installments after his death. The $150,000 was held taxable as a trans-
15Subsequent to the death of the testator, but prior to the final determination of the
case, the legislature added to the section covering gifts in contemplation of death
(R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4402) the words: "but no such transfer. . . made before such
three-year period shall be treated as having been made in contemplation of
death .... "' Although the court in the Ludington case did not mention this amend-
ment, it may have influenced the opinion.
"-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4402.
"122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989 (1948).
"In re Estate of Schuh, 66 Mont. 50, 58-61, 212 Pac. 516 (1923). It is interesting
to note that this early Montana case, under R.C.M. 1907, § 7724, repealed, arrives
at the same conclusion finally reached by the United States Supreme Court after a
long line of cases under the Federal Estate Tax beginning with May v. Heiner, 281
U.S. 238 (1930), and ending with Commissioner v. Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949). The
Schuh case, supra, was followed by In re Kohr's Estate, 122 Mont. 145 (1948), which
also reserved a life estate in the grantor.
'*75 Mont. 186, 243 Pac. 589 (1926).
[Vol. 26,
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fer to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after death. In reach-
ing this conclusion the court stated: "Clearly, a gift or transfer for a
valuable consideration must be in praesenti in order to escape the tax. '40
The result of this case may be correct, but the reasoning appears to be
unsound. R.C.M. 1947, section 91-4402, provides, in effect, that transfers
of property made within three years of death are presumed to be made
in contemplation of death unless made for "fair consideration in money
or money's worth." The court in Oppenheimer apparently ruled that the
matter of consideration applies only to transfers in contemplation of
death and not to transfers to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death.
If all the facts were known, the recent case of Estate of Maher41
might add nothing new to Montana law. However, the opinion stated
only that the decedent died a resident of Montana, owning no property
other than a right of revocation of a trust which she had created in
Pennsylvania many years before her death. The court did not indicate
whether the decedent was also a beneficiary of the trust. If she in fact
had reserved a right to income from it during her life, the trust would be
taxable under the Schuh -4 2 and Kohr4 3 cases. But the court mentioned no
such retained economic benefit; it said only that the "existence of this
right of revocation, modification or change, constituted a reservation of
an interest in the property '44 which was taxable. Under what provision
of the Montana inheritance tax law is it taxable? Montana has no code
section such as that in the federal estate tax, which specifically covers
transfers reserving the power to alter, amend or revoke. 45 Such a retained
right is not made a substitute for a will by any specific provision of the
Montana code. The beneficiaries did not receive their interest by will or
succession, but rather by the terms of a trust instrument executed long
before the death of the decedent. The only benefit accruing to the bene-
ficiaries at the settlor's death was the termination of the possibility of
revocation. However, termination of that power is not specifically made a
taxable occasion by statute.
The reasoning of the court in Maher is similar to that in the United
States Supreme Court of Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. 46 That case in-
volved a transfer in trust with a power of revocation reserved, which
was not made in contemplation of death. On the theory that the gift was
not complete until termination of the power of revocation by the trans-
feror's death, the Supreme Court held that it was subject to the federal
estate tax as a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death. Thus, the Maher case may be considered as holding that the
"Id. at 200, 243 Pac. at 592.
41140 Mont. 476, 373 P.2d 520 (1962).
'In re Estate of Schuh, supra note 38.
'In re Kohr's Estate, supra note 38.
"Estate of Maher, supra note 41, at 479, 373 P.2d at 521 (1962).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038.
46278 U.S. 339 (1929).
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termination of such a reserved power is a taxable transaction in Montana.
However, the decision might be better explained in a manner not men-
tioned in the opinon. Since the power to amend would include the power
to appoint other beneficiaries, a reserved power to alter, amend or revoke
might be regarded as a power of appointment. If so, the tax would be
specifically authorized under the section of the code making a power
of appointment, whether exercised or not, a substitute for a will.
47
JOINT TENANCIES, INCLUDING CO-OWNERSHIP
OF GOVERNMENT BONDS
48
How will a client affect the potential inheritance tax on all his
property by placing it in the joint names of himself and his wife?
Assume that the client has bought and paid for everything himself. He
has a home, some stocks, and a bank account, all in joint tenancy with
right of survivorship, and he has government bonds payable to himself
or his wife. The bonds and stocks are in a bank box to which both have a
right of access, but she in fact has not entered the box or handled the
stocks or bonds. Everything was placed in co-ownership form within the
last year. If the client should die tomorrow, probably all of this property
would be taxable to his estate. This is Decause the section concerning
jointly owned property49 can not be read alone. The statutes dealing
with transfer in contemplation of death or to take effect at or after
death5" and making the date of recording presumptively the date of the
transaction 5' must also be kept in mind. Half of each item would be tax-
able under the joint tenancy section.5 2 If the estate should be unable to
prove a contrary motive, the three year presumption would make the
other half taxable as a gift in contemplation of death. 53
If the client lived beyond the three year presumptive period only the
house and bank account would be taxable, as to the half theoretically in
the name of the decedent, under the joint tenancy section.5 4 The other
half, theoretically in the name of the survivor, would not be taxable as
a transfer in contemplation of death,5 5 unless it involved an instrument
delivered but not recorded prior to the three year period.56 Nor would
it be taxable as taking effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death,
since the wife had the right to the immediate use and possession of the
bank account and home during the decedent's life. However, under the
',R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4404.
'
8R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4405.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4405.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4402.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4408.
-
2R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4405.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4402, State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d
989 (1948).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4405.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4402.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4408.
[Vol. 26,
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Cole case5 7 if the wife's signature was not on the signature card, the bank
account would probably be taxable as a gift to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after death. The stocks and bonds would be taxable in
full. Since they were not in fact delivered to the wife, the half theoretic-
ally in her name would be taxable as intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death,58 and the half theoretically in the name of
the husband would be taxable under the joint tenancy section. 59
If the bank account had been a savings account and the husband had
not delivered the passbook to his wife, and if the deed to the house had
not been recorded until after the husband's death, the property might be
taxable in full to the husband's estate. The account would be taxable
under the theory of possession and enjoyment at or after death, and the
house under the statutory language that "all such transfers, if recorded
after the death of the person or persons making such transfer, whatever
form of such transfer, shall be deemed, for the purposes of taxation under
the provisions of this act, to have been made by will."6
If the wife rather than the husband died first it is questionable
whether any of the joint tenancy property would be taxable to her estate.
R. C. M. 1947, section 91-4405 excepts from the tax that part of the de-
cedent's interest in joint tenancy property "as may be shown to have orig-
inally belonged to the survivor and never to have belonged to the de-
cedent," and at one time the Montana law was clear that the joint ten-
ancy assets would not be taxed if the joint tenant who created the joint
tenancy survived the donee joint tenant.61 Montana law is now settled
that the bank account and the stocks would not be taxable,6 2 but some
question may still exist on the taxability of the real property.
The question of taxability of the real property was created by the
curious interpretation given to R. C. M. 1947, section 91-4405 in State v.
Hanson.6 3 The survivor in that case had provided the consideration for the
purchase of real property and promissory notes and had supplied the
money which created three joint bank accounts. The court, citing In re
Mayer's Estate,64 held the source of the consideration for the purchase of
the property was immaterial. The opinion stated that to come within the
exception the property itself, deemed to be bequeathed or devised, must
be shown to have originally belonged to the survivor and to have never
belonged to the decedent prior to the creation of the joint tenancy. Since
the land and the notes were purchased with the funds of the survivor, but
"Supra note 53.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4402.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4405. State Board of Equalization v. Cole, supra note 53. In re
Brown's Estate, 122 Mont. 451, 206 P.2d 816 (1949).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4408.
"
1In re Kuhr's Estate, 123 Mont. 593, 220 P.2d 83 (1950).
6State v. Hanson, 125 Mont. 174, 232 P.2d 342 (1951); In re Estate of Parks, 22
State Rep. 442 (April 15, 1965). See also In re Powell's Estate, 142 Mont. 133, 381
P.2d 957 (1963).
6Ibid.
I"Supra note 26.
1965]
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were not land or notes owned by the survivor prior to the creation of the
joint tenancy, the court held them to be subject to the tax. However, the
bank account was not taxed even though it represented only a chose in
action or credit with the bank. The court treated it as money, on the
theory that the joint tenancy section differentiates in some way between
bank accounts and other property. The case appears to be unsound in
theory and not supported by any distinction in the statute between bank
accounts and other property, or by the holding in In re Mayer's Estate.65
Although State v. Hanson66 has not been expressly overruled, two sub-
sequent cases, In re Powell's Estate6 7 and In re Estate of Parks,6 appear
to leave little vitality in the Hanson interpretation of R. C. M. 1947, section
91-4405. In re Powell's Estate69 held that United States bonds purchased
by the husband and a son of the decedent, and issued in the names of the
decedent and her husband, and the decedent and her son, came within
the exception in R. C. M. 1947, section 91-4405 as having originally be-
longed to the survivors. The court quoted from the Hanson case and ap-
plied the bank account theory of Hanson to bonds without expressly over-
ruling any part of the decision. Also, Powell's Estate, by implication,
seems to overrule Hanson with respect to promissory notes.
In the recent case of In re Estate of Parks7 ° the distinctions drawn in
Hanson were even further undermined and may have been totally elim-
inated. There the court upheld the lower court's finding that no inherit-
ance tax was due on shares of stock registered in joint tenancy which
had been purchased by the surviving spouse with her own separate funds
and held by her in exclusive possession. The Montana Supreme Court
relied upon the holding in In re Powell's Estate,71 pointing out that the
only difference in the situation before the court and the Powell case was
the nature of the property, shares of corporate stock in Parks Estate and
government bonds in Powell.
The real significance of the Parks Estate decision may lie in the lan-
guage utilized by the court in discussing the state's argument that State
v. Hanson should control the question of taxation of the corporate shares.
It pointed out that the Hanson case could not be deemed to control since
R. C. M. 1947, section 91-4405 had been amended since that case was de-
cided. In describing the effect of the amendment the court stated:
It [R. C. M. 1947, section 91-4405] was amended by adding a
clause to the property description, "however acquired" and also
the descriptive terms "tangible or intangible." Thus, after
amendment, the entire section, including the exception clause
6Ibid.
6 Supra note 62.67Supra note 62.
I'Supra note 62.
'Supra note 62.
"°Supra note 62.
'Supra note 62.
[Vol. 26,
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applies whether the property is tangible or intangible and no
matter whether the purchase price or the actual property is the
subject of the joint tenancy. 2
This language seems to leave little force remaining in the Hanson de-
cision. However, Hanson was not overruled and may still be applicable to
real estate purchased by the survivor where title is taken in the names of
the survivor and the decedent as joint tenants. Until such time as the
court explicitly overrules Hanson, a donor wishing to avoid the possible
remaining effect of the case may wish to purchase real property in his
own name first and then create a joint tenancy under R. C. M. 1947, sec-
tion 67-1602 (1).
INSURANCE
Under present law, $50,000 of life insurance is exempt from tax
whether payable to the executor or directly to the ultimate beneficiaries.7 3
Proceeds of annuity contracts and unmatured endowment contracts are
treated as insurance.
7 4
However, the proceeds of a matured endowment contract, left under
a supplementary contract with the insurance company at interest, are
not insurance and are fully taxable.7 5 A transfer of insurance policies in
trust less than three years before the death of the transferor, which re-
quires the trustees to collect the proceeds of the policy at the death of
the transferor and pay them to beneficiaries named in the trust instru-
ment, is not taxable as a gift in contemplation of death. The special in-
surance exemption controls the general provision as to gifts in contem-
plation of death, whether the beneficiaries are named in the insurance
policy or in a trust agreement.
76
The insurance exemption will not allow insurance proceeds to be
followed through two estates. If the beneficiary dies the day after the
insured dies, the tax exemption does not apply to the money received by
the heirs or legatees of the beneficiary from the insurance company. 77
The Montana Supreme Court has treated an annuity as insurance in
three cases.7 s In the last two cases this decision was reached on the sole
basis of stare dccisis.7 9 The court in the first case reasoned that since
72-In re Estate of Parks, supra note 62, at 444.
"State v. Cline, 132 Mont. 328, 317 P.2d 874 (1957).
In re Fligman's Estate, 113 Mont. 505, 129 P.2d 627 (1942); State v. Midland
National Bank, 132 Mont. 339, 317 P.2d 880 (1957) ; State v. Harnerstrom, 133
Mont. 469, 326 P.2d 699 (1958).
75In re Harper's Estate, 124 Mont. 52, 218 P.2d 927 (1950).
"State v. Midland National Bank, supra note 74.
77In re Estate of Holland, 136 Mont. 324, 347 P.2d 473 (1959).
71In re Fligman's Estate, supra note 74; State v. Midland National Bank, supra note
74; State v. Htammerstrom, supra note 74.
'State v. Midland National Bank and State v. Hammerstrom, supra note 74. Ia the
Midland National Bank case, supra note 74, at 345, 317 P.2d at 883, which was
quoted in the Hanmerstrorn case, the court said:
However, appellant would have this court reverse its holding in In re
Fligman's Estate, 113 Mont. 505, 129 (P.2d) 627, wherein it was held
1965]
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the license fee paid by insurance companies is based upon premiums for
annuities as well as life insurance, annuities and life insurance may be
equated. 0 This is much like saying that because the income tax on a
grocery business is calculated upon receipts from potatoes and eggs,
potatoes and eggs are the same. None of the cases have attempted to de-
termine whether the legislative reason for the insurance exemption ap-
plies to annuities. Future cases may hold that it does not.8'
Application of the $50,000 exemption to insurance made payable to
an executor or administrator also faces the possibility of further attack.
A strong dissent in the case of State v. Cline82 pointed out that such insur-
ance passes to the beneficiaries by will or by the laws of intestacy rather
than by the terms of the insurance contract. According to statute only
insurance proceeds passing to the beneficiary directly by the terms of an
insurance contract must necessarily be "deemed" to pass by will. The
statute directs that the exemption shall be prorated between the bene-
ficiaries in proportion to the amount of insurance payable to each. Where
the insurance is paid to the executor or administrator and becomes a part
of the general assets of the estate useable for payment of debts, taxes, etc.,
there is no assurance that any specific amount of insurance is payable to a
specific beneficiary.8 3 Because of the apparent instability of this phase
of the law, it would seem inadvisable to make insurance payable to the
executor or administrator if there is any other way to provide liquid assets
for an estate.
NON-RESIDENT DECEDENTS84
R. C. M. 1947, section 91-4401(2) taxes transfers of property of non-
resident decedents when the property is "within the state or within its
jurisdiction." The meaning of "within its jurisdiction" is clarified by the
cases of State ex rel. Banker's Trust v. Walker8 5 and State ex rel. Walker
v. Jones.8 6 Because the Montana Power Company had property in Mon-
tana, the state in the Banker's Trust case attempted to tax shares of com-
pany stock physically located in New York and belonging to a non-resident
decedent. The court held that the state had no jurisdiction over the stock,
since the ownership of the corporate stock gave no ownership of the
actual property in Montana. In the Jones case, a New York decedent had
that annuity proceeds were exempt under R.C.M. 1947, section 91-4406.
That case was decided in 1942. Eight legislative sessions have been held
since the decision, and the legislature has not seen fit to amend the
statute. Estates and property have been planned and settled on the
basis of the decision in the Fligman case, and if necessary to this decision,
this court would treat that opinion as stare decisis.
10In re Fligrnan's Estate, supra note 74.
8 See, State ex rel. James v. Aronson, 132 Mont. 120, 314 P.2d 849 (1957) and In re
Murphy's Estate, 99 Mont. 114, 43 P.2d 233 (1935) with regard to stare decisis.
'Supra note 73, at 330, 317 P.2d at 875 (Bottomly J., dissenting).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4406.
'R.C.M. 1947, §§ 91-4401, -4413.
170 Mont. 484, 226 Paa. 894 (1924).
180 Mont. 574, 261 Pac. 356 (1927).
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notes and mortgages physically located in New York, but the mortgages
were upon real property in Montana. The court said that since the
power of the courts of the state would be needed to enforce the debts,
the debts were property within the jurisdiction of Montana under the
inheritance tax law.
In 1945 the present R. C. M. 1947, section 91-4413 was passed.8 7 It
exempts intangible personal property of non-resident decedents if the
decedent's state of residence has a reciprocal law exempting Montana
resident's intangible property located in that state; or if the decedent's
state does not impose a transfer or death tax on intangible personalty of
Montana decedents. Since every state except Nevada, which has no in-
heritance tax, has a reciprocal law, intangible personal property of a non-
resident simply is not taxed.
Intangible personal property is defined by statute as "moneys, stocks,
bonds, notes, securities and credits of all kinds, secured or unsecured. 8 8
Three Montana cases, all involving real property in Montana, have arisen
on the theory that the non-resident decedent had only an intangible per-
sonal property interest which was not taxable. In re Hunter's Estate,8 9
involved a partnership in land and cattle and also a contract to purchase
land in the name of the decedent. Since the properties were purchased
with community property funds from California, the widow of the de-
ceased partner claimed that the decedent held half in constructive trust
for her and that only one-half should be taxable. The court held her
California community property right to be so subject to limitations and
restrictions that no constructive trust could be impressed on the Montana
property; nor could the presumption that the title was in accordance
with the record be overcome.
In State v. Kistner90 the court was concerned with real property in
Montana subject to a contract of sale with deed in escrow. It was held
that the interest of the decedent vendor was intangible personal property
not subject to the tax, since his right to the land was only as security for
the debt.
In In re Perry's Estate,91 mining claims, a dredge, machinery, bank
accounts, accounts receivable, United States bonds and prepaid insurance
were owned by a partnership of which the non-resident decedent was a
member. The representative of the estate contended that the decedent's
share went to the surviving partners to settle the affairs of the partnership
and that the estate had a right to share in any remainder after the satisfac-
tion of liabilities. Thus, the estate claimed only a chose in action, an in-
tangible personal property right. The court held the property to be taxable
"7Laws of Montana 1945, ch. 3, § 1, at 5.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4453.
"1125 Mont. 315, 236 P.2d 94 (1951).
"0132 Mont. 437, 318 P.2d 223 (1957).
1121 Mont. 280, 192 P.2d 532 (1948).
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in Montana, saying in effect that after the partnership affairs are settled
the real estate of the partnership is held by the owners as tenants in
common, and the remainder of the property is tangible personalty.
The principles of Perry's Estate may be subject to future attack. Since
the case arose, the Uniform Partnership Act has been adopted in Mon-
tana. 2 It provides that "a partner's interest in a partnership is his share
of the profits and surplus, and the same is personal property." 93 The
Perry case did not involve a situation in which the realty must be sold to
pay debts leaving only personalty, nor did it discuss the status of ac-
counts receivable, bonds, or prepaid insurance, all of which are clearly
intangible personal property that might be treated separately.
TAXES ON LIFE ESTATES AN) REMAINDERS
When each beneficiary receives sonic asset at the time of distribution,
it is easy to determine who pays the tax and how it is payable. But what
happens if the will leaves a life estate with contingent remainders? The
early case of In re Fratt's Estate9 4 dealt with a life estate to a niece with
the remainder to her children, if any, and if she were to die without issue,
then to children of the testator's brother. The court held that the niece
could not be taxed on the value of the remainder. Since the remainder-
men could not be determined until the happening of the contingency, the
tax could not be calculated. After this case the legislature enacted a new
inheritance tax law95 which included provisions comparable to R. C. 1M.
1947, sections 91-4432 to 91-4436. R. C. M. 1947, section 91-4435 provides
that when estates are created dependent upon contingencies, "a tax shall
be imposed upon such transfer at the lowest rate which, on the happening
of any of said contingencies or conditions, would be possible under the
provisions of this act, and such tax so imposed shall be due and payable
forthwith out of the property transferred." The section also provides for
a payment of an additional amount in case a higher rate should be ap-
plicable after the contingency has occurred.
However, the rule of Fratt's Estate, that one beneficiary can not be
forced to pay the tax of another, may still be vaid.9 6 R. C. M. 1947, section
91-4419 provides for a bond allowing the tax payment to be postponed,
subject to six per cent interest, until the persons beneficially interested
"shall come into actual possession or enjoyment." Thus, a life tenant
might force the administrator to postpone payment of all but the tax on
the life estate until the termination of that estate, since any tax paid on
-'R.C.M. 1947, §§ 63-101 to -515.
3R.C.M. 1947, § 63-403.
9460 Mont. 526, 199 Pac. 711 (1921).
'-Laws of Montana 1923, ch. 65, at 140. See particularly § 15 at 155.
96See also In re Powell's Estate, 110 Mont. 213, 101 P.2d 54 (1940), which held that
an administrator was not liable for a tax with respect to property passing directly
to the beneficiaries by contract, when the administrator had held no property of
any kind going to those beneficiaries, and that he could not withhold the tax
applicable to that property from assets going to other beneficiaries.
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the remainder before that time would be payable out of property of the
life tenant. The law is not clear on this matter.
If the life tenant has the power to dispose of the corpus for her sup-
port and maintenance, is it a fee or a life estate? If she dies within six
months of the testator's death when she should have had a life expectancy
of about six years, how is the life estate valued? State v. Robb97 held that,
notwithstanding a power in the life tenant to invade the principle for
the limited purposes of support and maintenance, it was still a life estate.
The value of the life estate was to be based on the standard of mortality
and value given in R. C. M. 1947, section 91-4432, regardless of how long
the tenant actually lived.
RETROACTIVE EFFECT
The validity of various retroactive applications of the Montana in-
heritance tax law has been tested in a number of cases. All cases dealing
with the retroactive application of a law tending to increase the tax on
an estate have held the application valid but one case held the retro-
active application of a law decreasing the tax to be unconstitutional.
Since the 1897 act, there has been some provision which would make
the act effective as to any estate not yet distributed or on which an in-
heritance tax had not been paid at the effective date of the act.9 8 In Gels-
thorpe v. Furnell,99 the decedent died before the passage of the act, but his
estate was in process of probate at the date of enactment. It was con-
tended that it would be unconstitutional to apply the act to the estate as
it would be an interference with a vested right and an impairment of a
contractual obligation under Article I, section 10 of the Constitution of
the United States 00 and would also be a violation of the equal protection
provision of the fourteenth amendment.101 The court said that the tax was
imposed upon the right to receive property, not upon the property itself;
that although the rights of the beneficiaries were vested, they were vested
subject to the process of administration, of which payment of any taxes
was an incident, and that the imposition of the tax was not unconstitu-
tional.
The case of State ex rel. Murray v. Walker,10 2 decided that the 1921
inheritance tax act taxed the widow only on the first $25,000, subject to a
$10,000 exemption. Before the Murray estate was distributed the legisla-
ture changed the law, providing a different exemption for a widow and
fixing a rate applicable to amounts receivable by a widow over $25,000.
1132 Mont. 558, 318 P.2d 576 (1957).
98R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4457.
1120 Mont. 299, 51 Pac. 267 (1897).
°"'No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts."
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
101' 'No state shall .. .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
1064 Mont. 215, 210 Pae. 90 (1922).
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State ex rel. Rankin v. District Court'0 3 determined that it was not uncon-
stitutional to apply the new rates and exemptions to the Murray estate.
The decision did not distinguish between the establishment of a new rate
applicable above $25,000, which would increase the tax, and the increase
in the exemption for a widow, which in some cases would undoubtedly
reduce the tax. Both changes in the law were applied retroactively.
The next case raising the question of retroactivity, In re Clark's
Estate,0 4 held that it was unconstitutional to apply a deduction which had
been created by the legislature after the death of the decedent. 0 5 The
opinion held the retroactive application of the deduction to be unconsti-
tutional on two grounds. First, the court rejected an argument based on
the Rankin and Gelsthorpe cases, that if the state could impose or increase
a tax after death, it could also diminish a tax at any time before distribu-
tion, and stated that the right of the state to a tax and the right of the
beneficiaries to receive the property both vested at the moment of death
of the decedent. Primarily on the authority of the United States Supreme
Court case of Cooledge v. Long, 06 the court held that interference with
such a vested right would be unconstitutional under the contract and due
process clauses and explicitly stated that the Gelsthorpe and Rankin cases
could not now be followed as authority for the proposition that the
legislature may retroactively tax estates.10 7 Secondly, the court held that
to retroactively apply a deduction which did not exist at the decedent's
death would violate section 39 of Article V of the Montana Constitution,
which prohibits the legislature from diminishing any obligation owed to
the state.'
State ex rel. Blankenbaker v. District Court,0 9 held that the statutory
extension of the presumption of contemplation of death, from two to
three years before death," 0 did not apply to transfers made prior to the
amendment. No constitutional question was raised, and the Cooledge and
Clark cases were not discussed. The case simply said that statutes should
not be construed as retroactive unless this was expressly required or
clearly and necessarily implied. The court did not consider the next
section of the same act which made the act applicable to estates of all
decedents dying since 1921 and whose estates were undistributed at the
effective date of the act." The case apparently follows the theory of
10370 Mont. 322, 225 Pac. 804 (1924).
1" 105 Mont. 401, 74 P.2d 401 (1937).
1'0 Laws of Montana 1935, ch. 186, § 1(8), at 407.
1-282 U.S. 582 (1931).
107The court noted that at the time of the Gelsthorpe decision the tax was not imposed
at death, but rather after appraisal, and that the Rankin case did not discuss the
difference in the time of imposition of the tax.
'08"Except as hereinafter provided, no obligation or liability of any person, association
or corporation, held or owned by the state, or any municipal corporation therein,
shall ever be exchanged, transferred, remitted, released or postponed, or in any way
diminished by the legislative assembly; nor shall such liability or obligation be
extinguished, except by the payment thereof into the proper treasury."
10109 Mont. 331, 96 P.2d 936 (1939).
'Laws of Montana 1935, ch. 186, § 1(3), at 405.
'Laws of Montana 1935, ch. 186, § 1(4), at 405.
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Cooledge v. Long that the taxable event is the vesting in title at the time
the gift was made.
The Cooledge case, upon which In re Clark's Estate relied and which
expresses the same rationale as found in the Blankenbaker case, involved an
inter vivos transfer in trust. It contained a strong dissent by Mr. Jus-
tice Roberts, concurred in by Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone, which
expressed the view that the rights of the ultimate beneficiaries were not
vested, except in a technical legal sense, until they were entitled to enter
into possession and enjoyment at the testator's death. 1 2 As the tax was
on the right to receive the property, the right was not fully vested before
the testator's death and it was not unconstitutional to change the law
between the date of creation of the trust and the final vesting in posses-
sion and enjoyment. The theory of vesting expressed by the dissent in the
Cooledge case has been applied by later decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States to cases involving other substitutes for wills.
1 1 3
The Montana court may also be shifting toward the theory that the
taxable event is the transfer of possession to the beneficiaries. In re Kohr's
Estate,"4 involved a nonrevocable transfer in trust, reserving a life estate
in the donor. The court held that the rate to be applied in taxing the trans-
fer as a gift to take effect at or after death was the rate contained in the
1935 statute, which was in effect at the date of death of the transferor,
and not the rate in effect in 1915 when the trust was created. The ma-
jority opinion distinguished between "vesting in interest" and "vesting
in possession" and determined that the shifting of economic benefits at
the time of vesting in possession at the termination of the life estate was
the taxable event to which the rate applied. A logical application of the
theory enunciated in the Cooledge case would have required a different
result.
Thus, under present Montana law the tax on a transfer by substitute
for will may be altered at any time before the beneficiary obtains a
right to possession. In the case of a transfer in trust with a life estate
reserved in the transferor, any changes in the tax law prior to the death
of the life tenant will clearly affect the transfer. However, the Montana
Code does provide that all taxes imposed by the act shall be due at the
death of the decedent, "except as hereinabove provided";115 and further
that the act shall apply "to the estate of any decedent on which the in-
heritance tax has not been determined by the court and paid prior to the
date when this act takes effect, to the same extent, and in the same man-
ner, as though this act had been in full force and effect at the date of
death of such decendent." 6 A question remains as to whether, under these
'Cooledge v. Long, supra note 106, at 606 (Roberts J. dissenting).
'"United States v. Manufacturers' National Bank of Detroit, 363 U.S. 194 (1960);
Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
"'122 Mont. 145, 199 P.2d 856 (1948).
"'R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4415.
-
6R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4457.
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statutes, the theory that vesting in possession is the taxable event would
require a change in the rule of the Clark case." 7 A future case may permit
the retroactive application of a change in the law after the decedent's
death and prior to actual payment of the tax in an estate where the vesting
in possession is delayed until the court's decree of distribution." S
MONTANA ESTATE TAX
A survey of the Montana inheritance tax law would not be complete
without some consideration being given to R. C. M. 1947, section 91-4411
which provides for a Montana estate tax. This section, which purports to
impose as an estate tax an amount equal to the excess, if any, of the
maximum credit for state death taxes provided in the federal estate tax,
over the total amount of death taxes levied by any state with respect
to the property of a decedent, is of questionable validity. This estate tax
section was passed in 1933 and refers to the United States Revenue Act
of 1926 and amendments thereto. It also refers to the 80 percent credit
for state death taxes allowable under the United States Revenue Act.
But, the present federal estate tax law is not an amendment to the 1926
law. In 1939 Congress enacted an entirely new revenue act and repealed
all of the 1926 law." 9 Moreover, the 1954 Code was again a completely
new act repealing the 1939 law. 20
Even if the Montana estate tax were to be held invalid, the amount
of tax paid by a given estate would still be the same. The federal credit
is only a maximum credit, and is allowable only to the extent paid to a
state.' 21 However, the validity of the act does concern the state of Mon-
tana. If the act is valid, the tax, to the extent of the maximum federal
credit goes to the state. If the act should be held invalid, the money
would go to the federal government. The legislature would do well to
amend this section by eliminating the references to the 1926 law and the
80 percent credit, and by referring only to the maximum credit allow-
able under the Internal Revenue Code.
17Supra note 104.
"
8There are certain other incidental matters that the attorney handling estates and
inheritance tax problems should keep in mind:
1. R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4438, which allows for an application for rehearing within
sixty days of an inheritance tax determination, may be a pitfall. If the motion for
rehearing is either denied, or granted and the original order affirmed on rehearing,
the right of an appeal from the order determining the tax may be affected. An order
determining inheritance tax is appealable within sixty days of entry. The motion
for rehearing does not extend the time to file an appeal. In re Blankenbaker's
Estate, 108 Mont. 383, 91 P.2d 401 (1939). Nor can the correctness of an order
determining inheritance tax be reviewed on an appeal from a decree confirming a
final account. In re Sattes Estate, 59 Mont. 220, 195 Pac. 1033 (1921).
2. The inheritance tax is based upon the appraised clear market value of the
property, not upon the sale price from an estate. In re Walker's Estate, 111 Mont.
66, 106 P.2d 341 (1940).
3. Although a widow's allowance was once deducted from the taxable estate, In re
Blackburn's Estate, 51 Mont. 234, 152 Pac. 31 (1915), this deduction is no longer
available. In re Wilson's Estate, 102 Mont. 178, 56 P.2d 733 (1936).
"Revenue Act of 1926, repealed, Act of Feb. 10, 1939, 52 STAT. 1 (1939).
"nRevenue Act of 1939, repealed, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 80, § 7851, 68A STAT.
919-24 (1954).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 80, § 2011.
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